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Confronting Judicial Values:
Rewriting the Law of Work in a Common
Law System
JAmEs ATLESONt
The need to reform the federal law of labor relations has
been a staple of discussion for many years, but the current debate on the wisdom and possible shape of change is more thorough and sustained than at any time in recent memory.' A good
deal of discussion has centered on the types of substantive or
procedural changes that would make the promises of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 more of a reality. Thus,
many valuable proposals have been presented, for instance, for
streamlining the representation process and strengthening the
power of the National Labor Relations Board to remedy violations of the statute. All of these suggestions make certain assumptions about the effectiveness of law in effectuating change
and, more commonly, in strengthening and invigorating unions.
The most commonly made argument in favor of the Wagner
Act 3 was that it would reduce industrial conflict, an argument
framed in large part to ease what was perceived to be a serious
constitutional hurdle. Other goals were present as well. 4 One
theme was that the economy would be strengthened by independent unions which could insist upon a more equitable division of
profits, thereby maintaining high purchasing power. The Act,
then, was seen as consistent with the view that the Depression
was caused by under-consumption. Unionization, therefore,
would serve positive social functions, one of which was to ret Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. The author acknowledges the always inciteful comments of Fred Konefdky. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association in Washington, D.C., in January 1995.

1. See, ag., Charles Morris, A Blueprintfor Reform of the National LaborRelations
Act, 8 ADmN. L.J. 517 (1994); WILLIAM GoULD, AGENDA FOR RETORM (1993); PAUL WELER,
GOVERNiNG THE WORKPLAcE: THE FuTuRE OF LABOR AND EmLoYMENT Law (1990).

2. 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1994).
3. Id.
4. Karl Kiare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the WagnerAct and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 281-85 (1978); JAMEs ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw, ch. 2 (1983).
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strict corporate power. Closely related, the most important
theme in all of Wagner's speeches was that the statute would effect a greater economic stability by creating a better economic
balance. Finally, and germane to the theme of this essay, the
enlargement of democratic processes in the workplace was independently valued, partly because it would deepen the roots of
political democracy. The failure of unions to ever organize more
than approximately thirty-five percent of the workforce, their
limited organizational density at present, the opposition of most
employers, and the weaknesses of the National Labor Relations
Act, obviously threaten the goal of industrial democracy, condemning most workers to toil in highly autocratic work
situations.5
If we assume, despite all contradictory indications, that labor law reform supportive to workers and unions occurs, can
drafters avoid the judicial assertion of a quite different set of
values? Those who propose changes assume, as they must, that
the values or goals of such enactments will not be subverted by
a hostile or indifferent judiciary or National Labor Relations
Board. Yet, in this area where feelings are strong and deepseated, all issues are contentious. After all, the employment relation is one of the important human relationships in which, especially for individual workers, the common law does not assume any inherent notion of fairness. Moreover, as the volume
of academic scholarship demonstrates, the labor law field is littered with judicial decisions which seem inconsistent with the
language, purpose, and the legislative history of the National
Labor Relations Act.
The issue is more complex than inherent bias, for there are
real differences of opinion affecting every conceivable question
in the field. Apart from economic or social bias or differences of
value, people bring different assumptions to each issue. Each decision-maker looks at the situation through the lens of experience, one which refracts light in different ways. To avoid decisions that are based upon values which are inconsistent with
legislation requires, in addition to good lawyering, a recognition
of the importance of economic power as well as the power of
ideas. The former means that both the likelihood of legal reform
as well as the future responsiveness of the courts will be
strongly affected by the amount and expression of union power.
The latter, relating to our perception of the employment rela5. ATLESON, supra note 4, at 34-43.
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tion, suggests the need to reconceptualize the way we view that
relationship.
A focus on judicial values means that two serious issues can
be dispatched quickly. First, there must be considerable doubt
whether supportive legal change of any kind can occur in the
present political climate, especially in the absence of strong or
at least troublesome unions. 6 Changes in the law of unionemployer relations have occurred only rarely, generally because
of special circumstances. Moreover, except for perhaps the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 7 passed during the Hoover administration,
the Wagner Act of 19358 remains the sole twentieth century example of an exclusively union-supportive, federal legislative enactment. The passage of the statute turned on unique historical
circumstances, and surely the most significant cause was the degree of turbulence in labor-management relations. 9 Since then,
the unions' legislative agenda in relation to collective labormanagement issues consistently failed even during Democratic
control of the United States House and Senate.
A second question involves the type of changes we might expect if amendments to the NLRA did occur. If all or even most
of the suggested proposals were indeed enacted, the United
States might have the labor law of Ontario. Indeed, many U.S.
unionists and scholars look longingly at the legal systems of certain Canadian provinces, believing that legal rules are the primary cause and explanation of union strength or weakness. The
reverse possibility is rarely considered, that is, that legal rules
are the result and not merely the cause of strong unions. 10 The
problematic relationship of legal rules to satisfactory social outcomes is too little discussed. In any event, although union density in Canada has historically been considerably higher than
that of the United States, density in Canada is falling, suggesting the importance of factors other than substantive law."
Moreover, a number of Canadian scholars are quite critical
of the "Wagner-model" of labor legislation and they include both
the United States and Canadian labor law regimes within that
6. See generally James B. Atleson, The Prospects for Labor Law Reform, 18 POL'Y.

STUD. J. 364-373 (1989-90).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1994).
9. See Karl Kare, supra note 4, at 265; see generally MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DEOF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNrIED STATES (1987).
10. James Atleson, Law and Union Power: Thoughts on the United States and Canada, 139-171, in REFLEaE LABoUR LAW (Ralf Rogowski and Ton Wilthagen, eds., 1994).
11. PRADEEP KumAR, FROM UNFORmITY TO DIVERGENCE: NDUSmRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA AND THE UNrrED STATEs 31-38 (1993).
CLn
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characterization." The changing nature of work in an international environment, for instance, may suggest that maintaining
the Wagner Act structure, even supplemented by helpful amendments, may not be an adequate response to contemporary conditions. Harry Glasbeek and Judy Fudge of Osgoode Hall Law
School in Ontario, for instance, note that in Canada there has
been an exponential growth of small firms which are generally
more difficult to organize and, obviously, are less attractive to
unions.13 Improvements in organizational procedures, even if
leading to greater unionization, are "unlikely to make a great
deal of difference" because small firms have "little to offer workers by way of extra economic or job security benefits, whether
they have been organized or not."14 Arguing for consolidated bargaining structures, the authors submit that fragmented organizational structures cannot deal with a revamped economy exhibiting increasing competition in relation to wage rates. 15 In short,
unions need structures which enable "them to take wages out of
competition far more than the collective bargaining statutes as
administered presently permit." 6 n addition, the authors believe that the collective bargaining model is "posited on the notion of a male full-time employee, while non-standard types of
employment are increasing" 17 To focus only on improvements in
the collective bargaining model, assert the authors, is to give
the model a status to which it is not entitled: "it treats that regime as an optimum evolution of capital-labour regulation,
rather than just a valuable compromise which labour squeezed
18
out of capital at a propitious time"
Lawyers, however, have been trained to believe that law
can be an engine for change. Comparativists such as Janice Bellace and Roy Adams, among others, convincingly argue that
state policy has real effects. 19 Legal rules certainly affect the
12. Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, PC1003-The Legacy (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the BUFFALO LAW REVIE).

13. Id. at 52.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 53.
17. Id. at 49.
18. Id at 6L See Howard 'Wial, The Emerging OrganizationalStructure of Unionism
in Low-Wage Services, 45 RUTGES L REv. 671, 672 (1993). See also, Roy Adams, A Pernicious Euphoria: 50 Years of Wagnerism in Canada,McMaster University Working Paper #395 (1994), where Adams discuses the strong desire to maintain the model despite
"its failure to accomplish its essential objectives ...

.

Id. at 3.

19. Roy Adams, State Regulation of Unions and Collective Bargaining:An InternationalAssessment of Determinants and Consequences, in THE FuTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RaLATIONS: GLOaAL CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 41 (John R. Niland et al. eds., 1994); Janice R.
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outcome of particular disputes, and law can affect the way in
which employees and employers envision possibilities and re-

straints. 20 Drafters of legislation, however, must consider the

very real risk that the supportive goals of new legislation may
be derailed or finessed by a quite different set of cultural values
that often, although not always, has motivated the judiciary.
The point is not to denigrate serious and thoughtful proposals
for legislative reform, but only to note that legislative revision is
not the end of the effort. The historical existence of an often
hostile judiciary means that a double-discounting occurs in relation to any labor legislation. After the congressional balancing of
political power results in legislation, the courts may subsequently assert values which may be inconsistent with the drafters' purposes.
Many scholars have recognized that certain labor law decisions do not seem to be consistent with the principles of statutory interpretation, that is, some rulings are seemingly not
based upon the statutory language, the legislative history, or
the statute's professed goals. The seeming incoherence of a good
deal of American labor law can be explained by a quite coherent
set of judicially held values which resonated from or paralleled
those expressed in nineteenth century opinions. 21 These values
included the following:
(1) Continuity of production must be maintained, limited only when statutory language dearly protects employee interference.
(2) Employees, unless controlled, will act irresponsibly.
(3) Employees possess only limited status in the workplace and, correspondingly, they owe a substantial measure of respect and deference to
their employers.
(4) The enterprise is under management's control, and great stress is
placed upon the employer's property rights in directing the workplace.
(5) Despite the participatory goals of the NLRA, employees cannot be full
partners in the enterprise because such an arrangement would interfere
Bellace, The Role of the Law in Supporting Cooperative Employee RepresentationSystems, 15 Comp. LAB. LJ. 441, 458-60 (1994); Janice Bellace, Labor Law Reform for the
Post-IndustrialWorkplace, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1994 SPRING MEETING OF THE INDUS. RFL
RESEARcH AssW 460-65 (Apr. 21-23, 1994).
20. See WIlIAM FOREATH, LAw AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MovEmENT
(1991); VicrOTnA HATrAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER THE ORIGINS OF BUSINESS
UNIoNIsM IN THE UNITED STATES (1993); CHRISTOPHER TOMLINs, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZE LABOR MOVEmm IN AmERICA, 1880-

1960 (1985). For a detailed and thorough discussion of the effect of the new Employment
Contracts Act in New Zealand, see Ellen J. Dannin, We Can't Overcome? A Study of Freedom of Contract and LaborLaw Refbrm, 16 BERKELEY J. EMPL & LAB. L 1 (1995).
2L ATLESON, supra note 4, at 7-9.
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with inherent and exclusive managerial rights.2

These values, in short, involve the presumed limited status
of employees, the prerogatives of owners, and the placement of
continued production on the highest rung of value, but the list
could easily be expanded to include a more abstract set of beliefs. Thus, some decisions seem to reflect the view that collective representation and action is inconsistent with individualism, that collective bargaining conflicts with the value of
individual effort, initiative, and evaluation, and that the proper
focus should be the individual employee-employer relationship,
meaning that the union is an "outsider" to that relationship.
Moreover, courts have frequently treated workers and unions as
inherently violent. 2 Last but not least, the fear of class solidarity and conflict might explain the early injunctions against picketing as well as the traditional opposition to the secondary boy24
cott and, especially, the sympathetic boycott.
American law has historically viewed unions as an "outsider" to the employment relationship, a view often voiced, explicitly or implicitly, by current supporters of worker participation schemes. 25 Unions and collective bargaining are often
viewed as the source of the problem, not the remedy. More specifically, unions are often seen as the occasion for conflict in the
workplace, rather than simply the result of that conflict. Rather
than being seen as the embodiment of the workers, unions are
seen as intruders into the relationship.
One hears echoes of this theme in almost every representation campaign as employers seek to exploit the American fear
and distrust of the "outsider." Although it may not be surprising
that employers would view a union organizational attempt as
something like "The Invasion of the Body Snatchers,"26 the same
theme is repeatedly reflected in legal decisions. Let me offer a
few examples out of many that could be presented. In the latter
half of the nineteenth century, some craft unions secured virtual
22. Id.
23. Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of
Picketing and Boycotts, 1894-1921, 37 BuFF. L REv. 1, 3 (1989).
24. See generally Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L Rsv.
807 (1993).
25. The first appearance of attempts to create what would now be called participation schemes was the 1920s, another period when the labor movement seemed moribund. See Thomas Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L REv. 499, 519 (1986).
26. A highly memorable film in which pods from outerspace take over human minds
and bodies.
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monopolies over certain kinds of skilled work. When union
membership was intimately related to actual work, courts, as
Clyde Summers has shown in his classic articles, began to shed
their reluctance to interfere in the organizational affairs of "private organizations." 27 Courts stressed that union membership
could not be arbitrarily lost if access to work would be affected
because workers had "property" rights in jobs or union membership. Often, courts focused upon the loss of union benefits such
as disability, retirement or death benefits, but the courts routinely found a legally-protected property interest to be involved
when union membership was tied to work.28 Some courts did not
even seek to find a specific property right but, instead, referred
to union membership itself as a significant property right.29 Unions, it was thought, should not be able to arbitrarily interfere
with work opportunities.
In 1890, for instance, a New Jersey court held that there
was no right to join a union, applying notions courts had long
used to avoid interfering with the internal affairs of private, voluntary organizations. 30 The power of the union to exclude, the
court said, was "incident to its character as a voluntary organization...." 31 With the growth of the closed shop, membership
in unions often became directly related to access to jobs, and
some courts indicated that such a monopoly challenged the
traditional reluctance to interfere with admission policies.3 2 The
growing power of unions was also recognized in cases where
members challenged internal union discipline. Courts began to
intervene when they found some property right involved, including access to various union benefits, such as disability or death
plans.A3 "The most serious economic effect of expulsion is that
the expelled member may be discharged from his job under a
union security agreement,"3 4 and courts "uniformly recognized
27. Clyde Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 CoLuAM L REv. 33 (1947) [hereinafter Summers, The Right to Join a Union]; Clyde Summers, Legal Limitations on Union
Discipline, 64 HARV. L REV. 1049 (1951) [hereinafter Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Discipline]; Clyde Summers, The Law of Union Discipline:What the Courts Do in
Fact, 70 YALE LJ. 175 (1960) (hereinafter Summers, The Law of Union Discipline].
28. See Summers, The Right to Join a Union, supra note 27, at 44-45; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, supra note 27, at 1051-54; Summers, The Law of
Union Discipline,supra note 27, at 178.
29. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, supra note 27, at 1053.
30. Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters Association, 20 A. 492 (N.J. Eq. 1890).
31. Id. at 525.
32. See, ag., Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 197 A. 720 (N.J. Eq.
1938).
33. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, supra note 27, at 1052-53.
34. Id. at 1053.
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that a man's trade is property, and his union membership, with
its ensuing benefits, is a property right which will be protected. 1 Finding some property right at stake provided the reason to intervene, and courts then developed the notion that a
union's constitution and bylaws were a contract so that discipline could be judicially reviewed under the union's own standards. The critical point is that when access to work was arbitrarily affected by a union, the right to work was treated as a
legally protectable interest. The union, treated as a third party
to the employment relationship, could not adversely and arbitrarily affect that relationship. The employer, however, as one of
the immediate parties to that relationship, could, under the doctrine of employment at will, end the relationship at any time
and for any reason.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in the 1940s exhibited justifiable concern when the Brotherhood of Local Firemen and Enginemen signed collective agreements designed to eliminate
black firemen on the railroads.3 6 Unions, said the Supreme
Court in creating a new doctrine without clear legislative support, could not discriminate on the basis of race because their
power over workers was derived from federal labor law. Unless
the union owes some duty to represent nonunion members of
the craft, said the Court, "the minority would be left with no
means of protecting their interests, or indeed, their right to earn
a livelihood by pursuing the occupation in which they are employed. " The Supreme Court's early recognition of the evils of
racial discrimination is commendable, and the legal result certainly creative, but fair treatment and freedom from arbitrary
bias was only required when the actor was a union or a union
bargaining with employers. The African-American firemen had
no parallel protection from arbitrary action on the part of employers, and, of course, they had few rights in the absence of
union representation. Moreover, the unions' representative
power over those involuntarily represented flowed more from
the union's economic power than from the Railway Labor Act,39
a statute created long after the union had secured bargaining
status on many rail lines. By focusing upon the union's legislatively-derived power, the Court was able to ignore economic
power, a recognition that would have forced it to confront the
35. Id.
36. Steele v. Louisville & N.MR Co., 323 US. 192 (1944).

37. I& at 203-04.
38. Id at 201.
39. 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1994).
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power of employers over workers even in the absence of unions.
In any event, it would be more than twenty years before similar
restrictions would be applied to employers, many of whom, as
corporations, are exclusively creatures of law.
The common law's treatment of employment, and certainly
the doctrine of employment at will, could be viewed as treating
the relationship as "private," one that should be free from public
regulation and interference. But as Karl Klare has convincingly
demonstrated, the "public/private" distinction in labor law has
been employed to characterize the same phenomena as "private"
or "public," and decisionmakers beginning from the same premise about the public or private nature of conduct can arrive at
diametrically opposite conclusions. 40 The employment relation
and the right to employment is sometimes treated as private,
but not when third parties seek to affect the relationship. The
work is said to be so important that the law will often protect
the employment relationship against outsider interference, yet,
at least until recently, insiders, usually employers, can end the
relationship for any reason. The employment relationship is
seemingly so valuable that the law of torts will protect it from
interference from outsiders, even if the transgressors are other
employers and even if the employment relationship is deemed to
be at-will, yet employment at will is still the common message
to workers.41
Concededly, the protection of the employment relation from
both judicial interference or the actions of "third parties" could
be simply seen as the application of traditional contract doctrine. What remains to be explained, however, is why normal
contract doctrine applies in different ways to employment. Thus,
employment at will, as many have noted, assumes, without an
inquiry into the parties' intentions, the employer's power to
make rules, interpret them unilaterally, and, most critically, discipline and discharge arbitrarily. Moreover, the modern easing
of doctrines of consideration and mutuality did not necessarily
apply to the employment relation. As Lawrence Blades noted in
his path breaking article in 1967, "from the contractual princi40. Karl Kare, The Public/PrivateDistinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1358, 1360 (1982).
41. Indeed, the tort doctrine of %justified interference with prospective advantage"
applies even if employment is at will See Geary v. US. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 177
(Pa. 1974); see also Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will in New York:
The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRAcusE L, REv. 939, 954-63 (1985);

Clyde Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62
VA. I, REV. 481, 489 (1976); Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will
Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 118 (1976).
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ple of mutuality of obligation, it has been reasoned that if the
employee can quit his job at will, then so, too, must the employee have the right to terminate the relationship for any or no
reason."42 When courts recognized that mutuality was not generally required under the law of contracts, they turned to "the real
obstacle to enforcing any kind of contractual limitation of the
employer's right of discharge-lack of consideration." 43 When
promises of permanent employment were explicitly made, and
even when these explicit promises were combined with action by
the employee in reliance of those promises, courts often treated
those promises as unenforceable for lack of consideration." Despite the modern relaxation of consideration requirements in
general, Blades still believed that "it is not policy but the technical difficulty of relaxing the rather rigid rules of consideration
which makes it unlikely that the employer's right to terminate
the at will employment relationship can be limited under contract law 45 Although the courts' decisions could be explained by
notions of freedom of contract, Gary Minda has argued that the
same principles could be used "to secure the reasonable expectations of the employee or employer from wrongful interferences
. . . " There is, in fact, "no a priori 'free contract' principle that
justifies the presumption that employment contracts of indefinite duration are intended by the parties to be terminable at
will."46 The critical point is that contract principles do not require the assumption that all employment of indefinite duration
is at will, and the traditional principles of contract law, especially the doctrine of consideration, are often applied more stringently in the context of the employment relation.
Finally, in a recent decision by the Eighth Circuit, Town &
Country Elea, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 47 the appellate court seemed to
directly challenge the critical policies of the Wagner Act by holding that an employer did not commit an unfair labor practice by
discriminating against employees, some paid union organizers
and others just members of the union, because they sought em42. Lawrence Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1404, 1419 (1967).
43. Id. at 1419-20.
44. Id. at 1420-21; see also, Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, supra note 41, at 488-89; Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr., The Effect of
the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1, 7-16 (1981).
45. Blades, supra note 42, at 1421.

46. Minda, supra note 41, at 983.
47. 34 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
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ployment in order to organize the workplace. 48 One cannot simultaneously be employed by a union and an employer, held the
court, and even employees who were not employed by the union
were denied normal NLRA rights because their "continued presence on the job will be determined by an entity other than itself "4 One cannot work for two masters, said the court, echoing
ancient master-servant law.50 The Supreme Court's recent reversal will not result in the immediate disappearance of these notions in the courts. 51
The notion that workers owe an obligation of fealty and loyalty to their employers suggested to the Eighth Circuit that
workers could not at the same time owe loyalty to their fellow
workers or the union. These ideas are mirrored in the language
of seventeenth and eighteenth century apprenticeship and indentured servant agreements. 52 Similar obligations have been
read into modem employment relations despite the contractual
assumption that only those obligations spelled out are to be enforced.0 Those familiar with the area will recognize parallels to
the exclusion from the statute of supervisors, managerial employees, and too-powerful Yeshiva professors. Perhaps the most
classic exposition of this view is to be found in the 1947 House
Committee Report on Taft-Hartley explaining its exclusion of supervisors from the statutory definition of "employee": "It seems
wrong, and it is wrong, to subject people of this kind, who have
demonstrated their initiative, their ambition and their ability to
get ahead, to the leveling processes of seniority, uniformity and
standardization that the Supreme Court recognizes as being
fundamental principles of unionism."" The legal issue arose because many supervisors, those valiant and rugged individualists,
were organizing and others were indicating support for collective representation. 55 Deeply embedded in legal thinking is the
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 628-29.
N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).

52. See SAMuEL McKEE, LABoR IN COLONIAL NEW YomR, 1664-1776 68-88 (1965);
DAVID GALENSON, WHrrE SERVrTUDE IN CoLONsAL AMEmCA 3-15 (1981).
53. See, ag., N.L.RB. v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bd. Elec. Workers, 346 US. 44,
472 (1953) (holding that the distribution of handbills to the public during negotiations
that disparaged the output of a television station is not protected: There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer.").

54. Cited in N.L.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 US. 267, 282
n.11 (1974).
55. Virginia A. Seitz, Legal, Legislative and ManagerialResponses to the Organization of Supervisory Employees in the 1940s, 28 Ax J. LEGAL Hisr. 199 (1984).
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notion that the expression of worker solidarity is foreign to
American soil, let alone to the work place. As Judge Edwards
said in an early criminal conspiracy case: "They (meaning a society of tailors) are of foreign origin, and I am led to believe are
mainly upheld by foreigners." 6 The judge was speaking in
1836. 57
Importantly, these underlying values are not limited to situations involving collective action or representation. The traditional common law hostility to collective action could be explained by the ascendancy in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries of values of individualism, freedom, and independence, ideas at variance with the strategy of unions to
seek independence via collective action. 58 Indeed, since the
1890s employees have been treated as being "at will," meaning
they can be discharged for any reason and at any time. Historically, the old contract rules of mutuality and consideration have
even barred the enforcement of explicit promises of long-term
employment, even though these rules have been modified in
other areas of contract law. The judge-made rule hangs on, although modified in many states by a variety of exceptions. Nevertheless, the modifications are often narrow or grudgingly provided, and in some major states the common law rule has not
been modified at all. In Pennsylvania, for instance, the state's
highest court decided to retain the doctrine because, if fairness
or good faith was part of the relationship, employers like U.S.
Steel would become hesitant to discharge employees, thus choosing employer freedom to be arbitrary over the competing job security interests of employees. 59 The fact that federal and state
laws already limit employers' unfettered right to discharge, and
that thousands of US. Steel's employees already enjoyed protection under 'just cause" provisions of collective bargaining agreements, was somehow irrelevant. The New York Court of Appeals
held, less forthrightly, that to read into unwritten agreements a
promise of good faith or fair dealing would be inconsistent with
the presumed right of employers to fire at will, neatly begging
56. People v. Faulkner, 4

COMMONS AND GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AasERi.

cAN INDusTRIAL SocIrY 315, 330-31 (1910).

57. For a fascinating analysis of the early conspiracy cases, see Robert. J. Steinfeld,
Courts and the Question of Class: JudicialRegulation of Labor Under the Common Law
Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy, in LABOR LAW INAMERICA HSTORICAL AND CRrICAL Es.
SAYS (Christopher L. Tomlins and Andrew J. King eds.) (1992).
58. This notion was suggested to me by Fred Konefsky in a far more erudite and
elaborate fashion.
59. Geary v. United States Steel, 319 A.2d 174, 179 n.13 (Pa. 1974).
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the very question before it.60 Such matters, said the court,
should be left to the legislature, although the New York Court
has taken an interventionist path in other areas of law.
American labor law is unique among western nations in its
double concern over the legitimacy of collective action and the
loyalty obligation owed by workers to their employers. On the
eve of the Revolution perhaps fifty percent of the workforce was
bound in some way, indentured or slave. 61 Free workers were
neither the most numerous or important group in the
workforce. 62 Indentured workers and apprentices had written
agreements specifying the duty of loyalty and fealty owed to
masters. Although the employment relation would be deemed
contractual in the 19th century, the "contract" would continue to
contain unstated assumptions of loyalty even when workers
were considered to serve "at-will."
Moreover, the employment relationship is treated differently
than other important social relationships in other areas of law.
Regina Austin found, for example, that judicial assumptions
about workers and the needs of management made it difficult
for workers to succeed when they sought to use the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. 63 The requirement that
supervisorial action must be extreme or outrageous, when combined with a deference to managerial authority, creates difficulties for employees:
Only the extraordinary, the excessive, and the nearly bizarre in the way
of supervisory intimidation and humiliation warrant judicial relief
through the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. All other
forms of supervisory conduct that cause workers to experience emotional
harm are more or less 'trivial' in the terminology of the Restatement of
Torts. The very ordinariness of such conduct and the ubiquity of the experience of pain at the hands of supervisors are justification enough for
the law's refusal to intervene.6

60. Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983). As the
dissenting Justice Meyer noted, the New York courts have read into many other kinds of
contacts an "implied covenant of fair dealing and good faitl" Id. at 311. The majority
did not explain why normal contract principles did not apply to employment arrangements, let alone why the court, the creator of the at-will doctrine, was not the proper forum to reevaluate its continuing wisdom.
61. See generally ROBERT STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABoR: THE EMPLOYMENT IN ENGLISH AND AmERicAN LAw AND CULTURE

(1919).

62. Id.
63. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L REv. 1, 8-12 (1988).
64. Id. at 18.
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Principles of constitutional law often apply in special ways

in collective as well as individual work situations. Scholars have
noted that the courts traditionally interpret the First Amendment in labor cases to provide extremely weak protection, for in-

stance, in situations involving employee picketing and handbilling, and writers are virtually unanimous in concluding that the
Supreme Court's often unique arguments for such distinctions
are weak and unconvincing.65 In addition, the scope of normal
constitutional protection is often narrowed when the state is the
employer.66 Similarly, the protections against illegal search and
seizure do not apply when the individual is a public employee.
As the Court noted in O'Connor v. Ortega,67 a search of a government employee's desk and file cabinets, made without warrant or probable cause, was reasonable and proper either for a
noninvestigatory work-related purpose or to investigate workrelated misconduct.68 A totally different type of example comes
65. See, eg., James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of FirstAmendment Values:
Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 196-99 (1984); James G.
Pope, Labor and the Constitution:From Abolition to Deindustrialization,65 TEX. L. Rv.
1071, 1075-76 (1987); Cynthia Eslund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 921, 926-41 (1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSrrrTUoNAL LAw 16881720 (2d ed. 1988); Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 948-49, 953-54 (1982).
66. See, ag., Cynthia Eslund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEo. WAsm L. REv. 1, 8, 12 (1990). To be protected an employee's speech must deal with "a matter of public concern." Connick v. Myers, 461 US. 138, 143 (1983). This is a necessary condition, but even in this case the interest in free expression can be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the
"interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees.'" Id. at 142 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ. of
Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). Moreover, a four-justice plurality in
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) noted that the injury need not be actual; instead, the state need only show that the speech threatened to interfere with governmental operations. Importantly, the Court stated that greater deference must be given to the
government when it acts as employer rather than as sovereign. A recent Second Circuit
opinion reversed its decision in favor of Leonard Jeffries at CUNY in light of the Waters
holding that the employer's prediction of disruption need only be reasonable, enough to
outweigh the value of the speech, and the employer took action based on the potential
disruption and not in retaliation for the speech. Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 E3d 9 (2d Cir.
1995). Another recent case held that a state judge enjoyed qualified immunity when he
fired a staff research attorney for Illinois' Fourth District Court of Appeals because of
his efforts to unionize his colleagues. Gregorich v. Lund, 63 US.L.W. 2711 (7th Cir.
1995). The Seventh Circuit held that the despite the lawyer's exercise of a constitutional
right, the judge could reasonably conclude that those with research responsibilities,
working closely with judges, would threaten the delicate working relationship by taking
such an adversarial position. Id.
67. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
68. Id. at 723-24.
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from copyright law where the constitutional power for Congress
to permit "authors" to secure a copyright in their "works" does
not apply if the author is an employee. 69 In such cases, the copyright law since 1909 has made clear that the employer is the
copyright owner of its employee's "works. 70
In many areas of law, therefore, the employment relationship is treated as unique. The normal rules of law often do not
apply, whether common law, statutory or constitutional. What is
never made clear is what is so compelling about the employment
relation to lead to such results. In some areas reasonable conclusions can be drawn. In collective action cases, the fear of class
action is not difficult to see. Since the criminal conspiracy cases
in the early 1800s, for instance, courts have reflected a fear of
the power of collective action, and the boycott and secondary activity cases demonstrate the concern that pressure may extend
beyond the immediate work place.71 But if collective action and
bargaining somehow generates concern over the effect upon individualist or property notions, how can we explain the presence
of a similar reticence to protect individual employees from arbitrary employer action?
This summary means that reformers face a difficult task in
limiting the vision of employment often found among the judiciary. Lawyers might assert that the primary means of restraining the judiciary is careful statutory draftsmanship. Perhaps the best example of effective drafting is the NorrisLaGuardia Act,72 which has generally been conscientiously followed by the lower courts despite its purpose to restrict the
most significant judicial power: the power to enjoin behavior.
Even here, however, judicial respect for legislative intent might
be due to causes independent of Felix Frankfurter's careful
drafting. In any event, even this statute has been finessed when
it conflicted with values the Supreme Court believed more important. For instance, a strike arguably in breach of a contractual no-strike clause is clearly a "labor dispute" within section
13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,73 seemingly barring the exercise of a federal court's injunctive power. Yet, the Supreme Court
69. See LATi, Er AL, CoPmIGHT FOR THE NINEs 303-21 (3d ed. 1989).
70. Id.
7L See Avery, supra note 23, at 11-36; Haggai Hurvitz, American Labor Law and
the Doctrine of EntrepreneurialPropertyRights: Boycotts. Courts, and the JuridicalReorientationof 1886-1895, 8 Indus. ReL L.J. 307 (1986); Minda, supra note 24, at 813.
72. 29 U.SC. §§ 101-115 (1994).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1994).
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in its 1970 decision in Boys Markets74 was able to approve injunctions against such strikes under NLRA section 301 by "accommodating" that statute to the developing law of collective
agreements, a body of rules ironically created by the Court itself
without significant legislative guidance. 75
The problem with the NLRA is not that it was carelessly
drafted, although it certainly is a loosely worded statute permitting, and often requiring, a common law type of interpretation.
In addition, of course, drafters can not foresee many of the
problems that may arise. The problem, however, is not simply
one of unclear legislative guidance, but that many cases tend to
present conflicts of values.7 6 The judicial application of values
quite different than those which motivated the drafters long
precedes the Reagan administration. The disillusionment with
the administration of the statute in the 1980s led some union
officials to call for the repeal of the statute, but the return to
the glorious days of yesteryear would hardly be helpful, at least
without a labor movement that relied less upon law than on organization and collective action.7
Conflicts also occur within the various levels of the federal
judiciary. There are, for instance, examples of long-term guerrilla warfare by appellate courts even in the face of clear Supreme Court directives. The phrase "guerrilla warfare" comes directly from a dissent of Judge Gibbons in NLRB v. K & K
Gourmet Meats,78 explaining that the Fourth Circuit's refusal to
approve Board orders directing employers to bargain under the
Supreme Court's Gissell7 9 decision was based on the appellate
court's disagreement with that decision. 8° In addition, appellate
courts routinely review the records of NLRB cases, often differing with the Board on questions of fact as well as law, despite
the Supreme Court's clear admonition to the lower courts in the
74. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 US. 235 (1970).
75. James Atleson, The Circle of Boys Market: A Comment on Judicial Inventiveness,
7 INDUS. & LAB. REL REv. 88, 106 (1985).
76. For instance, in Elk Lumber, 91 NLRB 333 (1950), a collective slowdown to respond to a substantial reduction in pay was treated at indefensible, conflicting with
management's control over the rate of work effort, whereas the workers were reflecting
collective values of solidarity.
77. See James Atleson, The Role of Law and Union Organizing: Thoughts on the
US. and Canada, in UNIONS AND PuBLIC PoLIcY (Lawrence G. Flood, ed., 1995).
78. NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 470 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting).
79. NLRB v. Gissell Packging Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
80. NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d at 470.
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Universal Camera8 l decision to respect the findings of the
Board, a case that ironically involved the Board.8 2 Arguments
that the NLRB's decisions should be upheld under well recognized administrative law principles are often found in dissents.0
Another obvious suggestion might be to make the stated
purposes and goals of any new amendments to the NLRA so
clear that even lawyers would have difficulty finding them porous or ambiguous. One cannot, however, overlook the creativity
of lawyers and the historical level of judicial resistance to collective values. The stated values of the Wagner Act, after all, were
relatively clear.84
Two recent examples of judicial or administrative creativity
are instructive. First, when organized professional workers at
the College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery-via collective
bargaining-gained significant participation rights in their
workplace, the Board treated them as "managerial employees,"
no longer covered as "employees" within the NLRA. 5 The professionals had seriously used collective bargaining to gain a measure of participation in their workplace, securing a measure of
"industrial democracy," but their very success removed them
from the coverage of the statute.
This outcome, based upon fairly recent Supreme Court decisions, also reflects the importance of the courts' perception of
union power. In the 1944 Hearst8 decision, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a broad definition of "employee" under the
NLRA so as to include within the Act all those who needed its
protection, no matter whether they would be treated as "employees" or "independent contractors" under traditional common law
rules. 87 The Court stressed that the act should be read broadly
so that it could "bring industrial peace by substituting... the
rights of workers to self organization and collective bargaining
for the industrial strife which prevails where these rights are
not effectively established."88 The stress on "industrial peace"
clearly reflected the Court's understanding that the NLRA,
passed in the midst of a turbulent labor period, could not fulfill
its goals without a liberal, inclusive interpretation. Such a mes81. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

82. Id. at 488.
83. See, ag., NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346, 349 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting); Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 US. 527, 541 (1992) (White, J., dissenting).
84. See Karl Klare, supra note 4, at 281-93; ATLESON, supra note 4, at 35-43.
85. College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery, 265 NLRB 295 (1982).
86. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
87. Id. at 127-28.
88. Id. at 125.
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sage was especially clear during wartime when the need to institutionalize labor relations within an administrative system
seemed eminently reasonable.89
Recently, however, in Bell Aerospace, Division of Textron 0
and Yeshiva University,91 the Court, without supportive legislative history or statutory language, excluded from the statute
perhaps hundreds of thousands of employees deemed to be
"managerial," workers who are in a position to "formulate and
effectuate management policies ... 792 There is no mention in
these opinions of a need to contain "industrial strife" or to institutionalize labor conflict within the beneficial embrace of the
statute. It is, of course, possible that the Court does not believe
that workers who can be deemed "managerial" are likely to be
disruptive. It seems more likely, though, that the Court no
longer sees a need to read the NLRA broadly because it no
longer fears the "industrial strife which
prevails where these
93
rights are not effectively established."
A second and related example deals with the scope of
mandatory bargaining. The Court has often stressed the policy
favoring the reduction of "industrial strife" as if it was the only
purpose of the NLRA. Nevertheless, the concern was used at
times to justify a fairly liberal interpretation of the NLRA. In
1979, for instance, the Court upheld a NLRB ruling holding that
the prices of Ford Motor Company's in-plant food service was a
subject of mandatory bargaining. 94 The employees had boycotted
the food service, and the Court referred to that mild action as
an example of the kind of "labor strife" that might occur if the
scope of bargaining was not interpreted in an expansive fashion.95 Yet, only two years later in First National Maintenancew
the Court held that a partial closing of the enterprise, obviously
much more critical to workers than cafeteria food prices, was
89. See James Atleson, Wartime Labor Regulation, the IndustrialPluralists,and the

Law of Collective Bargaining,142, in ImuSnuLx DEMOCRACY INAMERICA. TnE AMBIGUOUS
PROMISE (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds., 1993); JAMES ATLEsoN, LABOR

AN WArumE STATE (forthcoming, 1997).
90. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
91. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
92. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. at 288-89. Similarly,
the Court has recently expanded the definition of supervisor, excluding nurses who exercise some supervisory control over staff NLRB v. Health Care Retirement Ass'n, 511
U.S. 571 (1994).

93. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 125 (1944).
94. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 US. 488 (1979).

95. Id. at 497.
96. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 US. 666 (1981).
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not within the scope of mandatory bargaining. 97
These decisions indicate that the Court no longer feels a
need to read the statute broadly so as to institutionalize labor
conflict or even to protect worker concerns which seemingly are
encompassed within the statute. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the likely responses of the courts will be related to
the perception of weakened union power. Courts, as well as Congress, are affected by what is happening in bargaining rooms,
the workplace, and in the streets. Current decisions not only
embody certain judicial values that resonate throughout American legal history, but the state of the law also reflects the perceived strength of unions just as much as the hostility or indifference of any presidential administration. In a period of
reduced labor conflict and weakened unions, what will induce
courts (or Congress) to more effectively protect workers?
Aside from draftsmanship, another possibility is to change
the makeup of the courts, but the likelihood of this occurring
seems too remote. As the 1980s made clear, it is difficult enough
to assure a responsive National Labor Relations Board. Ultimately, the problem is not the courts alone. It is true that state
and federal legislatures often reflected a more supportive view
of workers and unions, only to be thwarted by judicial obstruction based upon particular views of the Constitution or upon
statutory interpretation. It may also be true, however, that
many legislative efforts may have been over-advertised as significant or even radical change. State legislative attempts to restrict conspiracy convictions or to limit the injunctive power of
courts in the nineteenth century, for instance, or even the Clayton Antitrust Act 98 in this century, may have been oversold to
pacify constituents. 99 As the current state of many areas of law
suggests, however, vigorous enforcement needs the eternal vigilance and constant prodding of a strong pressure group. 100
Congress and the courts seem to respond affirmatively to
unions only when they are seen as troublesome. True, with the
singular exception of the Wagner Act, legislative action in the
United States has often been more restrictive that supportive.
Yet studies suggest that although unionization may lead to more
97. Id. at 686.
98. 15 US.C. §§ 12-27 (1994).
99. See, ag., George Lovell, The Ambiguities of Labor's Legislative Reforms in New
York State in the Late Nineteenth Century, 8 STUDIES IN AmERIcAN PoTiCAL DEVELOPmENT 81-102 (1994); CHARLES GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 170-72 (2d rev. ed., 1961).
100. See generally FRANCES Fox PrVEN & RIcHARD A. CLOwARD, REGULATING THE
POOR. THE FuNcTnoNs OF PuBLIc WELFARE (1971).
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strikes, higher union density is also a consequence of strikes. 10 1
Unions tend to grow and expand when they are seen as active
protectors and militant representatives of employees. Only at
such times does the legal system seem to respond in a supportive manner. Unfortunately, there will be no possibility of a positive legal response unless unions are perceived to be vital and
potentially disruptive economic actors. 10 2
The current emphasis upon "competitiveness," found, for instance, sprinkled throughout the Dunlop Commission's factfinding report,10 3 ignores a commitment to democratic values in
the workplace. Those principles still involve the securing of industrial democracy, full freedom of association, actual freedom
of contract, and citizenship rights in the place where people
spend the lion's share of their lives. Comparative labor scholars
view with amazement our representation election process with
employers possessing a constitutional right to persuade employees not to join. Why should workers have the choice between
collective representation or working in an undemocratic, authoritarian structure?
No where else in the advanced liberal democratic world does industrial
autocracy have the level of legitimacy that it does in Canada and the
United States. In most other advanced countries industrial democracy is
seen to be the natural concomitant to political democracy and by some
combination of collective bargaining, works councils, representation of
corporate boards of directors and by labour participation in labour market and social protection nearly all working people have institutions in
place through which they are able to participate in the making of the
conditions under which they toil. 104

In addition, the United States is generally viewed as an exception to the notion, commonly found in other Western nations,
that workers are an organic and important part of the enterprise. 10 5 The more supportive legal regime in European countries, a reflection of more militant unions than their cause, demonstrates that effective representation is inconsistent with
101. Michael Wallace, Aggressive Economism, Defensive Control: Contours of American Labor Militancy 1947-81, in EcoNoMIc AND INDusRIAL DEMOcRAcY 10:7-34 (1989);
Michael Wallace, et al., American Labor Law: Its Impact on Working Class Militancy,
1901-1980, 12 Soc. ScL HisT. 1-29 (1988).
102. Atleson, supra note 77, at 165-77.
103. CoMMISSIoN ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPoRT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).

104. Adams, supra note 18, at 12.
105. Clyde Summers, Worker Participationin Sweden and the United States: Some
Comparisonsfrom an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L REv. 175, 180-89 (1984).
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neither capitalism nor "competitiveness." The goal must be to
reassert the idea that industrial democracy, or participatory involvement in this post-industrial age, is a vital part of the
rights of individuals.
Indeed, it is vital to a thriving democracy that workers engage not only in collective association but also in the making of
the rules under which they spend the greatest part of their
lives. To arbitrators, managers, and sometimes even union representatives, the questions that arise often seem trivial, unworthy of serious attention. Yet, as Thomas Kohler reminds us,
such a characterization would be a serious mistake:
Individuals and societies alike become and remain self-governing only by
repeatedly and regularly engaging in acts of self-government. It is the
habit that sustains the condition. Consequently, a democracy encounters
its greatest danger of becoming perverted when its people no longer have
direct responsibility for making the day-to-day decisions about the order
of their lives. This point represents an important aspect of the significance of collective bargaining as a social institution. For it is through
their involvement in the collective bargaining process that average citizens can take part in deciding the law that most directly determines the
details of their daily lives. Thus, unions and the practice of bargaining
can serve as "schools for democracy" where the habits of self-governance
and direct responsibility are instilled.?° 6

As Robert Wagner stressed, the firmness of the commitment
to political democracy depends in large part of the democratic
quality of workplace life. 107 Wagner's fears were expressed at a
time when hope was being extinguished in Europe, and he perceived real threats to democracy at home, a period not comparable to our own. Yet, at a time when Americans express great
skepticism about the viability of existing political institutions to
act in responsive ways, Wagner's concerns are nevertheless still
timely.
Although the most effective stimulus for labor law reform is
a vibrant, assertive labor movement, it might be time to change
not only the legal rules but also the ideas embedded in those
rules to alter the way the role of workers in the enterprise are
regarded. 08 If this does not occur, legal conflicts will still involve the rights of workers who are perceived to have limited
106. Thomas Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues,
36 B.C. L. Rzv. 279, 298-299 (1995).
107. See Mark Barenberg, The PoliicalEconomy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L REV. 1379, 1412-30 (1993).
108. See generally, Karl Kare, The Labor-Management CooperationDebate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARv. CIR-C LI Rzv. 39 (1988).
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abilities and thus limited rights to involvement in the workplace, challenging what is thought to be the greater wisdom and
the "property" rights of employers. The goal should be to develop
a vocabulary that treats workers as a valuable, organic part of
the enterprise, as long-term participants with a valuable investment and citizenship stake in the operation.1°9
In an atmosphere where "free enterprise" notions, reminiscent of the 19th century meaning of the phrase, affect everything from international trade to the neighborhood school, such
thoughts, even from a professor, might seem overly fanciful. Yet,
the very currency of these views suggest that ideas can change
and that ideas have power. The "market", after all, which is
used to define the scope of employer freedom, is a legal, social,
and political entity, defined by law itself. Moreover, political
rhetoric that proposes that taxes can be reduced while military
investment can be dramatically increased, and characterizes tomato catsup as a vegetable, suggests that the way we think
about the world of work could also change.110
One of the hallmark changes of the twentieth century was
the notion, now under attack and often simply ignored, that the
costs of enterprise consist not only of the price of labor and
materials but also the social, environmental, and economic effects of that enterprise. One of the costs of our current system is
that democratic representation at the workplace has become
highly problematic, sixty years after the passage of the Wagner
Act. The value at stake is that of industrial citizenship, as important now as it was in Robert Wagner's time. The value of
participation and protection in the workplace should be seen as
a human right, not just as a means to greater productivity or
reduced conflict. In the end, however, a general rethinking of
the employment relationship helpful to workers is unlikely to
occur without an upsurge of organization and militancy. Without
such action, rethinking and redefinition will continue to occur,
but the result will be a further weakening of individual and collective rights of participation.

109. I do not wish to stress the concept of "investment," which to some extent tends
to dehumanize the contribution of workers. Moreover, ownership rights without participation rights, as shareholders or worker-owners often realize, often is an empty shell.
But we do need a way to express democratic and participatory rights in the workplace.
110. It may be doubtful that such paradigm shifts can occur without changes in relative power. Yet, ideas do change. One can criticize the long-standing rule of employment-of-will but still be interested in why there recently has been some success in creating more humane exceptions to that rule.

